Trends in financial market concentration and their implications for market stability by Nicola Cetorelli et al.
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 33
Trends in Financial Market 
Concentration and Their 
Implications for Market 
Stability
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
magine two very different financial market structures. The
 first has many suppliers, each with only a small share of the 
market. The second has a few very large firms that supply most 
of the market, plus many smaller players that make up the rest. 
Which structure is more stable: the one with many small firms 
or the concentrated market where a few firms dominate? 
Which structure best describes financial markets in the 
United States? Those are questions we address in this article.1
A stable market is one that can endure shocks to supply or 
demand without collapsing—that is, without experiencing 
surging (or wildly oscillating) prices or sharply shrinking 
volumes. Stability requires certain self-correcting tendencies 
that ensure that a market can right itself. If supply falls because 
a major producer fails, for example, the resulting excess 
demand must push prices upward. Rising prices, in turn, must 
induce prompt substitution toward other suppliers or 
products. Substitution tends to dampen upward pressure on 
prices, thus stabilizing the market.
1Our study analyzes market concentration. That is, we focus on the risks to 
financial stability in markets with a few large suppliers. We do not discuss other 
forms of concentration that might be of concern to financial supervisors, such 
as concentration in a firm’s asset portfolio, concentration among users of a 
specific product or service, or concentration of many firms with the same risk 
exposures. These are all very important but distinct concepts requiring separate 
analysis. 
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• The issue of whether concentrated financial 
markets—those with a few large suppliers—
are more stable or less stable than less 
concentrated markets is important to 
policymakers and others concerned about 
potential market disruptions.
￿ An analysis of how U.S. financial market 
structure has changed over the last decade 
finds no pervasive pattern of high and 
increasing concentration.
￿ A complementary line of inquiry into the link 
between concentration and the risk or severity 
of market instability focuses on substitution by 
firms; substitution can stabilize markets by 
dampening the upward pressure on prices 
attributable to a large exiting supplier.
￿ The departure of a major supplier will cause 
less market disruption the more promptly 
other firms can substitute for it.
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Markets can experience shocks to supply or demand from 
many sources, such as changes in regulation, technological 
innovation, shifts in demographics, and knock-on effects from 
shocks to other markets or economic sectors. We focus here 
primarily on one particular type of supply shock: the failure 
and exit of one or more large suppliers. This is a natural 
channel to focus on given our interest in the relationship 
between market concentration and market stability, since the 
presence of a few large suppliers is the defining feature of a 
concentrated market.
The link between concentration and stability is hard to pin 
down, so we mostly try to identify the link by breaking it down 
into parts. For example, we distinguish between the probability 
of distress by a given firm and the severity of the market 
consequences in that event. After reviewing literature that 
investigates the link between financial market concentration 
and financial stability, we conclude that the link is ambigu-
ous—some of the side effects of changing market structure 
may have a stabilizing influence, while other influences may 
be destabilizing. Our own findings are consistent with that 
ambiguity. We find a mixed relationship between market 
concentration and volatility in the investment-grade-bond 
and syndicated loan markets, consistent with an ambiguous 
relationship as suggested in the theoretical literature. We 
conclude that there are no simple answers to the question of 
whether concentrated financial markets are more stable or 
less stable than less concentrated markets.
Our analysis of how U.S. financial market structure has 
changed over the last decade produces more definitive 
conclusions. Using firm-level data from a variety of sources, 
including data collected by central banks, we document that in 
aggregate, most U.S. wholesale credit and capital markets are 
only moderately concentrated. Concentration in most global 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets is low, though 
rising. Overall, concentration trends are mixed, rising in 
some markets and falling in others. Given the rise in bank 
concentration at the national level, we view the moderate and 
mostly stable levels of concentration at the individual market 
level as surprising. We also find that linkages across markets 
have increased since the late 1990s as more second-tier firms 
have ventured into other markets. The stability implications of 
increased cross-market linkages are mixed; the probability of 
disruption is lower if firms in multiple markets are more 
diversified, but contagion across markets may make disruption 
more severe. 
 After documenting those facts, we return to the question of 
stability and concentration, but with a twist: we argue that the 
exit of a single large firm will cause less market disruption the 
more promptly other firms can substitute for the exiting firm, 
and we discuss market characteristics that will speed or impede 
such substitution. We then rank markets by potential 
substitutability among firms in that market (as proxied by 
turnover in market share rankings) on the one hand, versus 
concentration on the other. We find few markets with high 
concentration and low turnover.
In sum, our findings should offer some reassurance to 
policymakers concerned about whether high or rising financial 
market concentration portends greater financial market 
instability. Most financial markets, at least those in the United 
States, are not particularly concentrated, nor are they 
becoming more so. Moreover, even if the opposite were true, 
the implications for financial stability are ambiguous; it 
depends on what else is changing along with market structure, 
and on how fluidly other firms can substitute for the 
incapacitated firm. Looking at concentration alone, without 
considering these other factors, will not always provide a 
reliable view of the likelihood or likely damage from a market 
disruption. More detailed analysis of individual markets is 
needed to obtain a full understanding.
Our policy recommendations are simple. Besides the 
obvious—monitoring trends in concentration and turnover—
we advocate public policies that enhance substitution among 
firms within a given market by, for example, promoting 
standardization of products, ensuring rapid clearing of 
payments, and monitoring competition to ensure that key 
players do not become entrenched (and hence irreplaceable) 
because of privileged access to trading platforms or 
technologies. 
Markets can experience shocks to supply 
or demand from many sources . . . . 
We focus here primarily on one particular 
type of supply shock: the failure and exit 
of one or more large suppliers.
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2. The Ambiguous Link between 
Concentration and Stability
Why should a change in concentration affect either the 
probability of a firm’s distress or the severity of the consequent 
market disruption? In this section, we review theory and 
empirical evidence that address this question. 
History certainly suggests a link between market 
concentration and the severity of market disruption given 
the distress of a major market supplier. A good example is 
the market for original-issue, below-investment-grade (junk) 
bonds and the role played in it by Drexel Burnham Lambert. 
At the peak of the firm’s market dominance in the mid-1980s, 
Drexel’s market share oscillated around 50 percent, with a 
dollar value of issues up to ten times that of the second largest 
competitor (Altman and Nammacher 1987). As a result of 
well-known events, Drexel filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection in February 1990. 
Drexel’s exit significantly disrupted the junk-bond market. 
Return spreads over Treasury securities increased from an 
average of 400 basis points during the 1980s to 1,000 basis 
points after Drexel’s exit. Issuance also shrank substantially. 
The annual value of new issues declined from about $30 bil-
lion before Drexel’s exit to about $4 billion in 1990, and it 
took three years to return to pre-exit volumes (Edwards and 
Mishkin 1995). Moreover, negative repercussions were also 
felt in other industries, as large junk-bond holders attempted 
to find suitable substitutes for the services Drexel had 
provided.2 
Theory, however, has focused almost exclusively on the link 
between market concentration and the probability of a firm’s 
distress, offering mixed conclusions about the link’s direction. 
Some of the literature suggests a negative link between market 
concentration and the probability of firm distress. This 
literature focuses on how market concentration affects firms’ 
incentives to take risk, a concept with direct correspondence to 
the probability of a firm’s distress. Keeley (1990) as well as 
Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) argue that banks in 
2For example, this was the case in the life insurance sector, where foreclosures 
occurred as a result of sizable losses from junk-bond investments (Brewer and 
Jackson 2000).
concentrated markets have incentives to reduce risk. If higher 
concentration reflects decreased competition and increased 
profitability, then banks’ franchise values will be higher. Higher 
franchise values reduce the incentives of equity holders to 
engage in excessive risk-taking behavior that might jeopardize 
their franchise. Focusing more on how firms interact with each 
other, Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2004) argue that a 
market with a few large players will be stable most of the time, 
as firms choose optimally to act as cooperating oligopolists. 
However, one player will find it optimal, occasionally, to 
deviate from this strategy, and its action could lead to 
significant market instability.
There are also links between concentration and risk through 
a size channel. The dominant banks in concentrated markets 
are frequently very large, and large banks have opportunities to 
diversify and reduce risk. Concentrated markets thus should be 
more stable overall (for example, Allen and Gale [2000]). 
However, large firms may reoptimize by changing investment 
strategies (entering riskier market segments or adopting lower 
capital ratios) so that eventually overall risk might remain 
unaltered. Empirical evidence based on U.S. data supports this 
conjecture (Demsetz and Strahan 1997; Stiroh 2006).
While these factors suggest a negative or neutral link 
between market concentration and firms’ incentives to take on 
risk, other factors suggest the opposite effect. In particular, an 
increase in firm size may be associated with lower transparency. 
Size allows financial firms to expand across multiple geo-
graphic markets and lines of business. It also allows the use 
of increasingly sophisticated financial instruments and the 
evolution toward complex forms of corporate organization. 
This may result in reduced managerial efficiency, less effective 
internal corporate control, and the potential for increased 
operational risk. The increasing complexity of the organi-
zations could also render both market discipline and regulatory 
action less effective in preventing excessive risk exposure. Large 
size also raises moral hazard concerns if the owners of large 
banks operate under the presumption that they are too big 
to be allowed to fail. 
Given the ambiguous theoretical relationship between 
financial market concentration and financial market stability, it 
should come as no surprise that the scant empirical literature 
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market disruption?
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on that question also reaches conflicting conclusions.3 Using 
data across seventy countries from 1980 to 1997, Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) estimate the relationship 
between banking market concentration and the likelihood of a 
banking crisis.4 They find a negative relationship; as concen-
tration increases, the probability of crises decreases. However, 
De Nicoló et al. (2003) investigate empirically the role of 
concentration on an indicator proxying for the probability of 
the largest financial firms failing. Using cross-country data, 
they find that higher concentration is associated with higher 
probability of failure.
We find a similarly ambiguous relationship in our estimates 
of the link between concentration and volatility in two 
particular U.S. financial markets: investment-grade-bond 
underwriting and syndicated loans. Our two-step regression 
methodology constructs a measure of volatility from the excess 
variation in bond or loan spreads—variation above and beyond 
what one would predict given the risk of the issuer or borrower, 
contract terms (for example, maturity), and macroeconomic 
conditions at the time of issuance. (Our statistical methodology 
is described in greater detail in the appendix.) Put differently, 
volatility is measured by deviations in spreads that are not 
attributable to firm or macroeconomic fundamentals. Those 
nonfundamentals are presumably the types of disturbances to 
supply and demand that can destabilize a market.5
In the second stage of our regression methodology, we 
estimate how volatility in each market changes over time in 
relation to changes in the level of concentration, as measured 
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration.6 
The estimates of the volatility-concentration relationships are 
not robust; they depend instead on the market in question and 
the period under observation (Chart 1). For syndicated loans, 
3Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) also conclude that theory and evidence relating 
concentration and financial stability are ambiguous.
4Banking crises are defined as events where 1) emergency measures were taken 
to assist a nation’s banks (bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees to 
depositors or creditors, or large-scale nationalization), 2) nonperforming 
assets reached at least 10 percent of total assets at the height of the crisis, or 
3) the cost of rescue operations was at least 2 percent of GDP (see <http://
www.nber.org/digest/feb04/w9921.html>).
the relationship is nonlinear but generally negative, suggesting 
somewhat lower volatility as market concentration rises. For 
investment-grade bonds, the relationship is negative in a 
narrow range of low concentrations but turns positive for 
higher HHI levels, suggesting the opposite relationship 
to the syndicated loan market, at least for higher market 
concentration levels. However, the volatility-concentration 
relationship for bonds is unstable. When we exclude 
observations before 1990 (a period in which most banks 
were not allowed to compete for underwriting business), 
the relationship estimated over the observations in the 
1990-2004 period is negative.7
These findings showing variation across markets and across 
time do not support any particular conclusions about the 
relationship between concentration and volatility. Perhaps the 
safest view is to take these estimates as consistent with the 
ambiguous relationship in the literature we just reviewed. Put 
differently, our findings can be seen as a counter-example to 
hypothetical claims that concentrated markets are always more 
stable or less stable.
5While this volatility measure does not directly reflect the impact of a large 
supplier’s failure, we believe it provides a reasonable proxy for market 
resiliency to a range of supply and demand shocks. In fact, the measure tracks 
other, broader gauges of financial market instability fairly closely. For instance, 
the correlation between our annual measure of bond price volatility and the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) is close to 
70 percent. The VIX is a key measure of market expectations of near-term 
volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. Essentially, many 
consider this index one of the most important forward-looking indicators of 
investor sentiment and market volatility. We take this close correlation as 
evidence that the first-stage volatility estimates are doing a good job capturing 
changes in market stability over time.
6Volatile markets have more frequent and larger price disruptions (by 
definition), so the self-correcting tendencies required for stability are more 
demanding. We also looked at extreme events—that is, episodes in which 
our measure of excess volatility was in the tail of the distribution. The results 
were qualitatively similar to those reported in this article. To account for the 
possibility that price volatility might also depend on the business cycle, we 
also estimated a second-stage regression specification that, in addition to 
concentration, included several macroeconomic controls such as GDP 
growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation. Overall, the relationships 
depicted in Chart 1 remained fairly unchanged. 
Given the ambiguous theoretical 
relationship between financial market 
concentration and financial market stability, 
it should come as no surprise that the 
scant empirical literature on that question 
also reaches conflicting conclusions. 
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Sources: Securities Data Corporation; Loan Pricing Corporation.
Note: HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
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Chart 2
Share of Total Bank Assets Held by Top Four 
U.S. Commercial Banks
3.C o n c e n t r a t i o n  T r e n d s
We now examine trends in concentration across a selection of 
major U.S. financial markets over the past fifteen years. The 
basic question is whether the regulatory changes of the 1990s 
have led to a broad pattern of high and increasing concentra-
tion in U.S. financial markets. It is already well known that 
bank concentration at the aggregate level (measured by the 
market share of the four largest U.S. banks) has climbed 
steadily since the early 1990s (Chart 2), rising from less than 
10 percent of banking industry assets in 1990 to 25 percent 
at the end of 2004. Our review shows that high and rising 
concentration is not universal across individual financial 
markets. We find generally moderate levels of concentration 
in wholesale credit and capital market activities and in most 
OTC derivatives markets, plus a mixed pattern in terms 
of trend, with concentration rising in some markets and 
falling in others. The most noticeable exception is the 
prime brokerage market, where concentration is high (but 
declining).
Our review covers major U.S. wholesale credit and capital 
markets. Admittedly, these markets are not exhaustive; 
7Implicit in the relationship that we derived between price volatility and 
concentration is, among other things, our assumption that the pool of bond 
issuers does not change with competition among bond underwriters (our 
results assume similar conditions in the case of syndicated loans). If these 
assumptions do not hold, other explanations for our findings are also plausible. 
For instance, if more new issuers come to the market as concentration decreases, 
these issuers are likely to contribute to a negative relationship between price 
stability and concentration because, in general, there is less information 
available about them than about issuers with an established track record.
however, they do represent some of the most important 
markets for core wholesale financial and banking services.8
We measure market concentration by the standard n-firm 
concentration ratio, calculated as the sum of the market shares 
of the top n (two, three, or five) firms in the market, or by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the sum of squared market 
shares of all firms in the market.9 The HHI ranges from zero for 
a market with an infinite number of equally sized (very small) 
competitors to 10,000 for a market with a single competitor 
with a 100 percent market share. Guidelines published by the 
U.S. Department of Justice used in antitrust analysis specify 
that markets with HHIs of between 1,000 and 1,800 are 
considered “moderately concentrated,” while markets with 
HHIs greater than 1,800 are considered “highly concentrated.” 
Although the application is not direct, these figures are useful 
for interpreting the HHI figures we discuss.
3.1 Underwriting and Financial Services
The U.S. underwriting markets are dominated by a handful of 
large financial firms. Increased competition from bank entry, 
however, has changed the character and diversity of these 
8We do not look at the markets for deposit-taking or other consumer services, 
since studies have shown that these activities are conducted mostly in local 
markets and that concentration in local markets has not been increasing 
(Dick 2006). Nor do we analyze payment-related markets, since concentration 
in these markets, especially government securities clearing, is well documented 
and has been actively studied from a policy perspective. 
9In general, n-firm concentration ratios and HHIs display very high positive 
correlations. 38 Trends in Financial Market Concentration
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markets. Table 1 summarizes the levels and changes in 
concentration in the major underwriting and financial services 
markets: securities underwriting, syndicated loan, and merger 
and acquisition (M&A) advisory services. Chart 3 shows the 
change in HHI in these markets from year to year since the 
early 1980s.10 Overall, these measures reveal low to moderate 
levels of concentration across the markets. Average HHIs range 
from about 850 to 1,400, within or slightly below the 
Department of Justice’s “moderately concentrated” range.
Several markets have seen significant declines in 
concentration since 1980, most notably the high-yield-debt 
underwriting and M&A advisory services markets (Chart 3). 
Since 1990, the pattern across markets has been mixed, with 
some experiencing increases in measured concentration 
(equity initial public offerings [IPOs], seasoned equity, and 
M&A advisory services) and others experiencing declines 
(bond underwriting and syndicated loans). Even over the 
relatively short period since 1998, no consistent pattern 
emerges, with concentration in some markets trending up and 
concentration in other markets trending down.
Table 1










  Initial public offerings 1,149 4.32 60.7
  Seasoned offerings 854 4.85 49.2
  Investment-grade bonds 1,122 -3.41 56.4
  High-yield bonds 1,144 -1.54 56.1
Merger and acquisition
  advisory services 1,160 9.44 56.8
Syndicated loan 1,391 -1.97 50.2
Source: Securities Data Corporation.
Notes: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculations are based on the 
lead underwriter.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 39
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Triennial and
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U.S. Interest Rate Derivatives Contracts
Chart 4
BIS Estimates of Concentration in Over-the-
Counter Markets
Note: HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
3.2 OTC Derivatives Markets
OTC derivatives markets have grown tremendously in recent10 
years along with rising demand for corporate risk manage-
ment. Commercial banks are the largest dealers in these rapidly 
growing markets.11
Tables 2 and 3 summarize patterns in market concentration 
for a variety of OTC derivatives products. Table 2 reports 
information on concentration in global markets for interest 
rate and foreign exchange (FX) derivatives from the 2004 Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) Triennial and Semiannual 
Surveys on Positions in Global Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Markets.12 Chart 4 shows how concentration in these markets 
has varied from year to year since 1998. Overall, global concen-
trations for the major categories of interest rate and FX 
products are low or moderate, though rising.
The BIS survey does not publish concentration measures for 
the credit derivatives market. The last row of Table 2 presents 
an estimate of concentration for the OTC credit derivatives 
market based on U.S. dealers reporting to the BIS survey and 
information gathered from the annual reports of major non-
U.S. dealers. Our estimates reveal moderate levels of concen-
tration in the credit derivatives market during the 2000-04 
period. Moreover, concentration in credit derivatives products 
has declined substantially over the last few years as financial 
institutions have rushed to take part in this exploding market.
Table 3 reports concentration figures for equity-linked 
derivatives markets. Concentration in global markets is low to 
moderate for U.S. and European equity-linked derivatives, 
though concentration in the more specialized regional markets, 
such as in Asia and Latin America, is quite high. In addition to 
presenting BIS estimates of global market concentration, 
Panel B of Table 3 gives information on concentration for U.S. 
10The HHI for the syndicated loan market starts in 1986 because our data 
source for this market is not comprehensive before that year.
11For a thorough discussion of the link between derivatives markets and 
the risk of systemic events, see Hentschel and Smith (1994).
12The BIS database on major OTC dealers is made up of data collected by 
central banks in major industrialized countries. The BIS reports aggregate 
information on nominal positions and HHI concentration, but it does 
not collect or make available bank-specific information on the roughly 
240 reporters. 
Table 2
Concentration Trends in Interest Rate and Foreign 






Panel A: Global concentration: 
  BIS surveys, 1998-2004 
    U.S. interest rate derivatives
       Forward rate agreements  843 4.64
       Interest rate swaps 591 8.20
       Options 908 0.75
    Foreign exchange derivatives
       Forwards and swaps 420 5.30
       Options 544 2.31
Panel B: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
  Estimates of Concentration: 2000-04
    Credit derivatives 825 -14.04
Sources: Bank for International Settlements, Triennial and Semiannual 
Surveys on Positions in Global Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets 
(2004); Federal Reserve Bank of New York; company annual reports.
Notes: HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; BIS is Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements. Estimates for the credit derivatives market are calcu-
lated from the U.S. Reporter Survey, company annual reports, and call 
reports.
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reporters.13 Concentration in the U.S. OTC derivatives 
markets is higher, especially for the broader U.S. and European 
equity-linked markets. For smaller equity-linked markets, such 
as those in Asia and Latin America, however, concentration 
measures are comparable because they are essentially 
dominated by U.S. reporting firms.14
3.3 Secondary-Market Trading 
by Primary Dealers
An important element of liquid securities markets is the extent 
of secondary-market trading.15 Table 4 presents concentration 
measures for the secondary-market trading volumes of 
13We use a database on large U.S. reporters available from the Statistics 
Function of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as well as call report 
information. 
14We report the U.S. dealer information here to establish that it is reasonably 
comprehensive for the global market. In the analysis to follow, we will need 
firm-level data not provided in the BIS survey. For the interest rate and foreign 
exchange derivatives markets, we can construct reasonable proxies for firm-
level data from data on U.S. reporters and from annual reports of non-U.S. 
reporters. However, for the equity-linked markets, we are unable to collect 
sufficiently comprehensive data from these sources; thus, we use the U.S. 
reporter data.
15The primary dealer information (Weekly Report of Dealer Transactions, 
FR 2004B) is compiled by the Statistics Function of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. 
primary dealers in several types of securities.16 Concentration 
in secondary-market trading of Treasury securities is generally 
low, with the exception of the Treasury Inflation-Protected 
Securities (TIPS) market (row 4 of Table 4). However, the 
relatively high measured concentration in TIPS trading can be 
attributed to the early dominance of one dealer. With the TIPS 
market maturing, HHIs declined from 3,500 in 2002 to just 
below 1,500 by the end of 2004. Mortgage-backed, corporate, 
and federal agency securities trading also appears to be 
unconcentrated, with HHIs beneath or just above the 
Department of Justice’s “moderately concentrated” range. 
Actual concentration levels in these securities may be even 
lower than indicated by the HHIs in the table, since the primary 
dealer data may not cover the full range of market participants 
in the trading of these securities.
3.4 Prime Brokerage
An increasingly important business for investment banks and 
large commercial banks is prime brokerage. Prime brokerage 
firms essentially service the hedge fund community. Typically, 
16Primary dealers are banks and securities brokerages that trade in U.S. 
government securities with the Federal Reserve System.
Table 4










  Bills 515 4.88 37.6
  Coupons 596 3.44 42.5
  TIPS 1,826 11.43 71.9
Other securities
  Mortgage-backed 954 0.39 58.2
  Corporate  1,336 -5.76 73.6
  Federal agency 694 1.20 45.8
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Weekly 
Report of Dealer Transactions (FR 2004B).
Note: HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; TIPS is Treasury
Inflation-Protected Securities.
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Panel A: Global concentration:
  BIS surveys, 1998-2004
    Forward, swap, and option
      United States  924 7.44 —
      Europe 827 4.30 —
      Asia (ex Japan) 2,707 35.88 —
      Latin America 5,771 12.81 —
Panel B: U.S. reporters only,
  2000-04
    Forward, swap, and option
      United States  2,162 -0.001 53.3
      Europe 3,239 -9.65 70.5
      Asia (ex Japan) 4,257 25.15 77.6
      Latin America 6,976 4.38 96.2
Sources: Bank for International Settlements, Triennial and Semiannual 
Surveys on Positions in Global Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets 
(2004); Federal Reserve Bank of New York; company annual reports.
Note: HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; BIS is Bank for
International Settlements.
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they provide hedge fund clients with a variety of services: 
financing (securities lending, margin lending, or other 
structured derivatives products), trading and clearing, 
customer support, and research. The proliferation of hedge 
funds over the last few years has made prime brokerage a 
significant source of revenues for banks and other providers.17
Concentration measures for the prime brokerage industry 
in 2001-03 show that the prime brokerage market is more 
concentrated than the securities underwriting market 
(Table 5).18 HHIs are in the “highly concentrated” range, but 
concentration has remained fairly stable over the three-year 
period.
3.5 Global Custody
The global custody business involves processing trades across 
countries and safeguarding and servicing financial assets for a 
variety of large customers (institutional investors, brokers/
dealers, and money managers). Typically, the portfolio of assets 
held by global custodians for their customers includes bonds, 
equities such as mutual fund holdings, and derivatives 
products. With the rapid expansion of financial markets, assets 
in custody surged from $7.6 trillion in 1994 to $36.3 trillion in 
2000 and to more than $52.0 trillion in 2004.19
Global custody is a fairly specialized business requiring an 
international network of subcustodians and expertise in 
17According to Boston Consulting Group, hedge fund industry revenues 
in 2003 amounted to $60 billion. The servicing of hedge funds has generated 
roughly $15 billion in revenue opportunities for prime brokers.
18We use the HedgeWorld Service Provider Directory League Tables to derive 
HHI measures of concentration. The HedgeWorld rankings are based on a 
large pool of hedge funds tracked by TASS Research.
19Our source is The Global Custody Yearbook, 2005 Eleventh Annual Survey, 
Buttonwood International.
managing a large portfolio of securities denominated in several 
currencies. Consequently, global custody is dominated by a 
small number of major banks and specialist providers. The top-
five market for global custody during the 1994-2004 period 
averaged around 76.9 percent. Overall, during this period the 
market was moderately concentrated, with an average HHI 
of 1,397.
4.M a r k e t  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s
Thus far, our discussion has centered on the analysis of single 
markets. However, the probability of distress for a firm and the 
severity of market disruption may also be affected by 
interdependencies across markets. The emergence of large 
financial superstores in the late 1990s suggests that financial 
markets may now be more interrelated. In this section, we 
examine a variety of evidence on cross-market linkages, finding 
that these linkages have increased, especially since the late 
1990s. This increase has been driven mainly by a growing 
common set of second-tier firms, rather than by increases in 
the number of firms with top-five market shares in multiple 
markets.
Is an increase in cross-market linkages a concern for overall 
stability? On the one hand, the ability of financial firms to 
operate simultaneously in several product markets should 
open up better diversification opportunities, reducing risk and 
thus the probability of firm distress. On the other hand, the 
diversification benefits may be spent by undertaking riskier 
investment strategies, making the overall effect on risk unclear. 
Moreover, as financial markets become increasingly 
dominated by the same set of financial firms, these firms may 
also become more and more alike, thus actually increasing the 
risk of exposure to common aggregate shocks. Risk may also be 
enhanced when the same firms are big providers in multiple 
markets because alternate suppliers are needed in many places 
at once. This multi-market presence might potentially strain 
As financial markets become increasingly 
dominated by the same set of financial 
firms, these firms may also become more 
and more alike, thus actually increasing 
the risk of exposure to common aggregate 
shocks.
Table 5
Concentration in Prime Brokerage
Concentration





Growth in HHI (percent) -1.71
Source: HedgeWorld.com.
Note: HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.42 Trends in Financial Market Concentration
Sources: Securities Data Corporation; Loan Pricing Corporation.
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Correlation in Market Shares
alternate suppliers, especially if they themselves are operating 
in the same multiple markets. On net, firms that are active in 
multiple markets may be more diversified, but the financial 
system on the whole may be more vulnerable to firm-specific 
shocks.20 
We look at cross-market linkages through two lenses. First, 
we examine trends in market share correlations—that is, are 
banks’ shares in one market now more or less correlated with 
their shares in other markets? Second, we examine the extent to 
which individual firms have high shares across multiple 
markets and how those shares have changed. 
4.1 Correlations of Market Shares
One direct measure of linkages between two markets is the 
correlation of market shares of individual firms in any two 
markets. A high positive correlation would signal that firms are 
likely to have similar market shares in both markets. In fact, 
market share correlations have increased since the late 1990s, 
largely reflecting the increased role of commercial banks in 
underwriting activities. 
Charts 5 and 6 plot the market share correlation in selected 
securities underwriting markets and M&A advisory services 
from 1990 to 2004. The syndicated loan market has become 
increasingly more integrated with securities underwriting and 
M&A advisory services. The key reason for the higher 
correlation is bank entry; in the early 1990s, most large 
commercial banks at the top of the syndicated loan market 
hierarchy were not very active in securities underwriting, but 
by the end of the 1990s several leading syndicated loan 
underwriters were heavily involved in investment banking. 
The M&A and securities underwriting markets usually have 
low positive correlations. Generally, correlations among these 
markets have trended higher, especially after the mid-1990s, 
indicating that many underwriters have sought to achieve some 
synergies by operating in both markets. Stronger commercial 
bank presence is again a catalyst for the rising correlations. 
However, during this period a number of top-tier investment 
banks have also made an effort to increase their market shares 
in financial services.
20The failures of Drexel and Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
illustrate the perils of cross-market interdependencies. While Drexel’s failure 
roiled the high-yield-debt market, the broader impact was muted because 
Drexel was a very small player in other financial markets. In contrast, the 
collapse of LTCM created widespread concerns among market participants 
worried about liquidity across several closely integrated financial markets.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 43
4.2 The Presence of Large Banks 
in Multiple Markets
We now consider a second and even more direct measure of 
market interdependency: the extent to which individual firms 
have high market shares in multiple markets. We find that the 
number of firms ranking in the top five (by market share) in 
multiple markets has not increased since the early 1990s, 
though the number of firms with multiple top-ten and top-
twenty market shares has increased. Taken together, those 
findings reveal increased linkages across markets through the 
emergence of more “second-tier” providers, rather than 
through an increased commonality among “top-tier” 
providers.
Table 6 presents these findings for four markets: syndicated 
loan, investment-grade-bond underwriting, equity IPO, and 
M&A advisory services. Table 7 lists the top twenty firms by 
market share in each of these four markets in 2004.
The first measure in Table 6 is the number of distinct firms 
ranking in the top five (by market share) in just one market 
(top panel, column 1). The maximum possible for this number 
is twenty—in other words, twenty different firms occupying 
the top five rankings in the four separate markets. The mini-
mum possible, zero, indicates that the twenty available slots 
were occupied by firms all with at least two top-five ranking 
positions, indicating a high degree of (at least pair-wise) 
dependence across markets. We compute similar statistics for 
the top ten and top twenty firms (middle and bottom panels 
of Table 6).
This indicator, however, is silent about the extent of the 
linkages between these markets. Changes in the “single market” 
count could reflect more firms having high market shares in 
just two markets, in three markets, or across all four markets. 
This difference is important because the lower the number of 
firms that dominate these markets, the higher the degree of 
interdependency. To this end, we compute additional 
measures of multi-market interdependency. These indicators 
count how many firms occupy top-five rankings in at least two, 
Table 6
Banks Operating in Single and Multiple Markets
Year
In a Single 
Market
In All Four 
Markets
In Three or 
Four Markets
In Two, Three, or 
Four Markets
Among the Top Five Banks
1990 9 0 3 4
1995 7 0 3 5
2000 7 0 3 5
2004 6 0 4 5
Among the Top Ten Banks
1990 17 0 5 9
1995 19 1 4 8
2000 9 3 8 10
2004 8 2 8 11
Among the Top Twenty Banks
1990 29 1 12 19
1995 36 1 11 16
2000 16 7 13 22
2004 22 8 12 19
Sources: Securities Data Corporation; Loan Pricing Corporation.
Note: The markets are syndicated loan, investment-grade-bond 
underwriting, equity initial public offering, and merger and
acquisition advisory services. 
Table 7
Ranking of Top-Ten Firms in Bond Underwriting, 









Citigroup 5 (20) 5 10 5 (5)
Lehman 5 (10) 10 (20) 10 (10) 20
J.P. Morgan 5 (20) 10 5 (10) 5 (5)
Morgan Stanley 5 (5) 5 (5) 5 (5)
Goldman Sachs 5 (5) 5 (5) 5 (5) 20
Bank of America 10 10 20 (20) 5 (5)
Merrill 10 (5) 5 (10) 5 (10) 20
HSBC 10 20 (10)
Barclays 10 5 (5)
Credit Suisse 
   First Boston 10 (5) 10 (5) 5 (5) 20 (20)
Wachovia 20 20 10 
Deutsche Bank 20 20 10 5 (10)
ABN AMRO Inc. 20 10
Union Bank 
   of Switzerland 20 5 10 (5)
Paribas 
   Corporation 20 10 (20)
Royal Bank 
   of Scotland 10 (10)
Mizuho Financial 
   Group 10 (20)
Friedman Billings 
   Ramsey 10
Lazard 10 (20)
Sources: Securities Data Corporation; Loan Pricing Corporation.
Notes: The values 5, 10, and 20 indicate that a firm was ranked in the top 
five, top ten, and top twenty, respectively. Figures in parentheses are  
rankings in 1990; if there is no figure, the firm did not have a ranking in 
the top twenty that year. IPO is initial public offering; M&A is merger 
and acquisition.44 Trends in Financial Market Concentration
at least three, or even all four markets (columns 2-4 of the 
table). We compute similar statistics for the top ten and top 
twenty banks, respectively. In contrast with our first measure of 
multi-market interdependency, an increase in these indicators 
suggests more interdependency.
As Table 6 shows, the number of independent firms ranked 
in the top five in the four markets remained constant during 
the 1990-2004 period. In contrast, there is a reduction in the 
number of “single market” firms among the top-ten (from 
seventeen in 1990 to eight in 2004) and, to a lesser extent, 
among the top-twenty rankings. The other measures offer 
similar interpretation. Among the top-five rankings, there were 
no significant changes in the number of firms with large market 
shares in more than one market over time. In contrast, among 
the top-ten and top-twenty rankings, there was a clear increase 
in the number of firms that have large market shares in more 
than one market. Significantly, the largest changes occurred in 
the number of firms with large market shares in all four 
markets (among the top twenty) and in the number of firms 
with large shares in three markets (among the top ten).
These results suggest that the markets for syndicated loans, 
bond underwritings, equity IPOs, and M&As became more 
interlinked between 1990 and 2004. This finding is important, 
because a problem experienced by one of the key players in 
these markets is now more likely to spread to a larger number 
of markets. However, given that the new interdependencies 
emerge among second-tier firms, the disruption arising from a 
problem in one of these firms is likely to be smaller than what 
would emerge had the new market linkages arisen among first-
tier firms.21
5. Prompt Substitution Minimizes 
Disruptions
Our review of trends in financial market structure yields two 
main findings. First, while high and rising concentration is not 
universal, some markets are indeed highly concentrated or 
21Moreover, the presence of more firms operating simultaneously in these 
markets may make it easier for one of them to step in and replace the one in 
trouble, thereby reducing the disruptions due to its exit.
increasingly so. Second, financial markets are becoming more 
interdependent, and the same set of large institutions is 
increasingly likely to occupy top rankings in several markets.
The stability implications of higher concentration in some 
markets and increasing interdependence are two-sided. If the 
firms that dominate a concentrated market or that are spread-
ing across markets are more diversified, then the probability 
of a given firm’s failure should be lower accordingly. In such 
an event, however, disruptions may be more severe, because 
the exit of a dominant firm in a concentrated market leaves a 
bigger hole in that market and in any others where that firm 
was top-ranked.
Whether the failure of a leading financial provider will 
disrupt the entire market for a given product depends crucially 
on how quickly users can switch to other providers or products. 
If clients of the departed leader can readily switch to secondary 
providers at little extra cost, or if they can substitute a related 
service, the resulting disruption will be accordingly small. If 
switching is slow or costly, then disruptions will be more severe.
This section discusses financial product characteristics that 
tend to speed or slow substitution. We also compare financial 
markets by two simple indicators of potential substitution: the 
number of active providers and the turnover in providers’ 
relative rankings. Lastly, we array markets by those indicators 
and by the level of concentration. Markets with low turnover, 
indicating less potential for substitution among providers, and 
high concentration may be more susceptible to severe market 
upheaval in the event of failure by a leading firm than would 
those markets characterized by high concentration alone. 
Considering both characteristics together thus may provide 
more insight than examining concentration in isolation.
5.1 Ready (or Not) Substitution 
What determines how readily and cheaply financial market 
users can switch between producers or products? For the goods 
market, the answer would be tastes. Does the consumer like this 
product or producer better than another? For financial 
markets, the speed and cost of substitution depend on a variety 
of factors.
Substitution will be slower, all else equal, the closer the 
relationship between the provider and user. Bank loans, 
especially to small firms, are relationship-intensive compared 
with the more arm’s-length dealing in syndicated loans (to 
large firms), bonds (especially investment-grade), and stocks. 
Banks have to learn about a small firm before they lend, and 
that information gets embodied in the relationship.22 The same 
is true with junk bonds; underwriters require detailed 
knowledge of issuers before they can sell their bonds—
[Our] results suggest that the markets for 
syndicated loans, bond underwritings, 
equity IPOs, and M&As became more 
interlinked between 1990 and 2004.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 45
knowledge that could not be instantaneously or credibly 
transferred to another underwriter (Benveniste, Singh, and 
Wilhelm 1993). The price of bonds underwritten by Drexel 
dropped sharply before the firm failed, indicating that Drexel’s 
services could not have been replaced easily by other firms 
operating in the market or by alternative financial instruments 
(Brewer and Jackson 2000). Relationship-intensive products 
also tend to be highly tailored to clients, and customization 
slows substitution. Bank loans to small firms are bespoke 
products, with pricing, covenants, maturity, and other terms 
negotiated case by case. Syndicated loans to larger firms are 
more standardized, and bonds (especially high-grade) and 
stocks are even more so.
A second determinant of the speed or cost of substitution is 
the knowledge or technology required to produce or price a 
particular product. OTC derivatives can require considerable 
sophistication to value and substantial platforms to manage 
and market. For instance, a recent Federal Reserve study argues 
that the complexity of interest rate options may hinder 
substitutability in that market more than in the market for 
more commoditized OTC interest rate swaps, where the risks 
are linear and noncomplex in nature and the technology to 
manage them is widely dispersed.23 Some products also require 
more intermediation between users and “raw material” 
suppliers. The knowledge, technology, and relationships 
needed to make loans, for example, or to underwrite stocks or 
bonds may be more widely held than those needed to generate 
a supply of interest rate volatility for an options dealer.
Lastly, the speed and cost of substitution may depend on the 
duration of the product in question and the “speed” of the 
particular market. All else being equal, substitution will be 
slower or costlier the longer the exposure implied by a 
transaction. For instance, a long-term credit or counterparty 
relationship implies a longer exposure than a one-off service 
such as underwriting. The speed of the market—the frequency 
22A study by Polonchek, Sushka, and Slovin (1993) finds that when a bank is 
on the verge of failure, the values of its borrowers rise and fall with the 
prospects of the bank, precisely because investors know that firms may not 
readily switch banks.
23Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005).
of transactions and the time required between initiating and 
consummating a transaction—also affects the speed of 
substitution. In a fast market, with many transactions 
occurring over a short period—payments, for example—it 
would be more difficult for other market players to substitute 
promptly than in a slow market.
5.2 Comparing Substitutability 
across Markets 
How do the markets we examined rank in terms of potential for 
prompt substitution? It would be difficult to rank them directly 
by the various characteristics just discussed, as some products 
may not be very relationship-intensive yet still very technology-
intensive. Instead of applying those characteristics directly, we 
rank the markets by two simple proxies that should reflect the 
overall potential for substitution: breadth and turnover. 
Breadth is just the number of firms actively competing in the 
market. A thicker, deeper market suggests easy entry and plenty 
of substitutes. A thin or shallow market hints at informational 
or technological barriers that limit entry and, by extension, 
substitution. Turnover is the average change over time in the 
market share ranking of firms in a given market.24 High 
turnover means the leading firms are not entrenched and that 
users are in fact switching between providers. Low turnover 
suggests some friction—relationships or technological 
barriers—that limits substitution among providers.
There are significant differences in breadth and turnover 
across markets (Table 8). At one end, securities underwriting 
markets are very deep and have relatively high turnover. The 
numbers for market breadth may not fully capture the extent 
of likely substitution, however, since small or midsize under-
writers may not be able to substitute for top-tier firms. That 
said, the fairly high level of the top-five ratios in underwriting 
and financial services markets (Table 1) suggests the presence 
of several interchangeable top-tier underwriters. The turnover 
figures also suggest considerable movement in the hierarchy 
24Algebraically, turnover can defined by  , where   represents the 
change in the ranking of the firm   in two consecutive years. The change is 
measured in absolute value, so any moves up and down will not cancel out. 
Also, turnover is weighted by   (based on a firm’s asset size), so a move from 





In a fast market, with many transactions 
occurring over a short period . . . it 
would be more difficult for other market 
players to substitute promptly than in 
a slow market.
There are significant differences in 
breadth and turnover across markets.46 Trends in Financial Market Concentration
of underwriters over time, some of which can be attributed 
to bank entry, as noted above. The high turnover ratios in 
the M&A advisory services and syndicated loan markets 
also signify major changes in the hierarchy of top-tier 
underwriters. Overall, high breadth and turnover in these 
underwriting markets suggest the potential for reasonably 
fluid substitution.
Turnover in secondary-market securities trading by 
primary dealers is also relatively high. The exception is trading 
in corporate securities, where the turnover figure is about half 
that for many of the other security types, perhaps reflecting 
less-than-full coverage of all market participants in these data. 
The breadth measures are perhaps somewhat less relevant for 
these markets, as primary dealer status is regulated by the 
Federal Reserve. As noted above, the primary dealer data may 
not cover the full range of participants in these activities for 
non-Treasury securities.
In contrast with underwriting, M&A advisory services, and 
trading, turnover in the derivatives markets is considerably 
lower. To calculate the breadth and turnover numbers for these 
markets, we combine detailed data on U.S. participants with 
data derived from annual reports for major non-U.S. dealers.25 
The resulting figures combine activity across several derivatives 
products (swaps, options, and forwards) by the nature of 
the underlying instrument (FX, interest rate, and credit 
derivative). Although the markets are arguably distinct across 
some of these product types, we view the aggregate turnover 
figures as reasonably representative of the submarkets.
As intermediaries between sellers and buyers of options or 
swaps, top-tier derivatives dealers require ready and steady 
access to financial instruments (for example, callable debt or 
structured notes) or investors and clients (hedge funds) to 
facilitate these complex transactions. Top-tier derivatives 
dealers are required to commit significant investments and 
resources to building the infrastructure and maintaining these 
important trading relationships. Consequently, the exit of a 
large derivatives dealer would probably require a concerted 
effort by other top-tier dealers to fill the gap.26
The turnover ratio in prime brokerage during the 2001-03 
period is also significantly lower than it is for underwriting 
markets. This low estimate reflects the continued dominance of 
just a few firms. However, the recent boom in hedge funds has 
encouraged more aggressive entry in the industry, as evidenced 
25The global data from the BIS survey are available only in aggregate form, not 
on the firm-by-firm basis needed to calculate our turnover measure. While the 
BIS survey focuses on OTC products, it is not always possible to separate out 
OTC and exchange-traded derivatives from the annual reports. Thus, the 
reported turnover and concentration measures for interest rate and FX may 
include both OTC and exchange-traded products. 
26For a full discussion of tiering in the OTC U.S. dollar interest rate options 
market and a discussion of the structure of that market more generally, 
see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005).
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Initial public offerings 100 4.03
Seasoned offerings 60 3.64
Investment-grade bonds 40 1.95
High-yield bonds 30 2.54
Merger and acquisition 
   advisory services (1990-2004) 100 5.89
Syndicated loan (1990-2004) 40 3.10
Derivatives (2000-04)
Interest rate 40 2.21
Foreign exchange 40 1.57
Credit 40 1.63
Prime brokerage (2001-03) 35 0.69
Global custody (1994-2004) 20 0.87
Primary dealer (1995-2005)
Treasury bills 21 3.67
Coupons 21 2.15
TIPS (1999-2005) 21 2.79
Corporate securities (2002-05) 21 1.35
Mortgage-backed 21 2.43
Federal agency  21 2.44
Mean turnover, all markets 2.50
Sources: Securities Data Corporation; Loan Pricing Corporation; Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Weekly Report of Dealer 
Transactions (FR 2004B); Buttonwood International, The Global Custody 
Yearbook; Bank for International Settlements, Triennial and Semiannual 
Surveys on Positions in Global Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets 
(2004); HedgeWorld.com; company annual reports.
Notes: Estimates of market breadth represent the approximate number of 
firms that are actively participating, and collectively account for most 
of the business in each market. The turnover measure is weighted by 
market share. Periods in parentheses indicate the sample over which 
estimates are derived. Estimates for derivatives markets are calculated 
from the U.S. Reporter Survey, company annual reports, and call 
reports. TIPS is Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities.
In contrast with underwriting, M&A advisory 
services, and trading, turnover in the 
derivatives markets is considerably lower. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 47
Market Concentration and Turnover 
Top-five market share
Sources: Securities Data Corporation; Loan Pricing Corporation; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Weekly Report 
of Dealer Transactions (FR 2004B); Buttonwood International, 
The Global Custody Yearbook; Bank for International Settlements, 
Triennial and Semiannual Surveys on Positions in Global Over-the-
Counter Derivatives Markets (2004); HedgeWorld.com; company 
annual reports.
Notes: The chart plots the measure of market turnover by two 
different measures of market concentration for the seventeen markets 
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by the 5 percent decline in the market share of the two largest 
firms, mostly captured by commercial bank competitors.
The low turnover scores in derivatives and prime brokerage 
markets are not surprising, because they do not meet the 
prompt-substitutability criteria outlined earlier. These markets 
rely heavily on client relationships that are often built over a 
number of years. OTC derivatives products and prime 
brokerage services are continually evolving to meet the 
changing needs of the financial community and clients. Both 
markets require an extensive infrastructure to satisfy their 
sophisticated customers. As we discussed, OTC dealers have to 
commit significant resources to building and maintaining a 
trading infrastructure. Similarly, in prime brokerage hedge 
fund clients require integrated products and services that 
encompass trading in complex financial assets, financing 
(margin and securities lending), and customer support services.
5.3 The Concentration-Substitution
Dimension
The potential for market instability depends not just on 
concentration, we have argued, but also on the potential 
for prompt substitution. To summarize these potential 
determinants of instability, we use a graphical approach to 
classify markets based on concentration and turnover. 
Although this approach lacks the specificity that detailed case 
studies of individual markets might offer, it has the advantage 
of being easy to calculate using available market share infor-
mation for a wide number of markets. Thus, we argue, it 
is a useful first-cut indicator of the likely severity of market 
disruption that can be used to rank markets and prioritize 
resources for further investigation. 
The resulting concentration-substitution comparison is 
given in Chart 7. The chart arrays the seventeen markets we 
have examined by our measure of market turnover (along the 
x-axis) and by two different measures of market concentration 
(along the y-axis). The first measure of concentration is the 
HHI, which summarizes the overall degree of concentration in 
each market. The second measure is the market share of the five 
largest firms in the market. Empirically, the two measures are 
correlated. However, the top-five market share measure may 
help us identify markets where the largest participants have 
very large market shares, even if the overall market appears not 
to be highly concentrated based on the HHI.27
As it turns out, the results from the two different 
concentration measures are quite similar. The figures show no 
systematic relationship between concentration and turnover.28 
27This could happen if one or two firms had large market shares but there were 
many other small competitors. 
A possible objection to our analysis might be that a market with 
a naturally high level of turnover is also a market where the 
dynamics of entry and exit are such that one would never 
28The correlations between turnover and the top-five market share and HHI 
variables are negative but not statistically significant.48 Trends in Financial Market Concentration
observe a high level of concentration (the substitutability 
indicates low barriers to entry and hence low incumbent 
advantage). That we do not observe any relationship indicates 
instead that the two market characteristics convey independent 
information on market stability.
Focusing on market-specific patterns, Chart 7 also indicates 
that relatively few markets appear to be in the potentially 
unstable neighborhood of high concentration and low 
turnover (the upper-left-hand regions). Among the markets 
we examine, prime brokerage and global custody tend most 
strongly to fall into this region. While some other markets have 
relatively low turnover (for example, the FX, interest rate, and 
credit derivatives markets), they have low concentration, even 
when the markets are split into the more disaggregate sub-
categories by product type. Two other markets with somewhat 
high concentration—the mortgage-backed-security (MBS) 
and TIPS primary dealer markets—also have relatively high 
turnover. It is not unusual initially to observe higher concen-
tration in newly created markets such as the TIPS and MBS 
markets. As the markets have matured, concentration has 
come down with the entry of additional primary dealers.
As this simple example suggests, more detailed analysis is 
necessary to understand the true stability characteristics of 
particular markets. Such analysis could include examining 
trends in concentration, considering additional measures of 
concentration and market substitutability, and conducting 
descriptive case studies of individual markets.29 In our view, 
the basic analysis in Chart 7 is not sufficient to draw strong 
conclusions about individual markets in the absence of more 
detailed study. Instead, our point in presenting the chart is that 
by focusing solely on market concentration, one misses 
important factors influencing market stability. In particular, 
understanding the extent to which prompt substitution can 
take place is a crucial second factor in assessing financial 
market stability.
29See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005) for an example 
of a detailed market study—in this case, that of the OTC markets for U.S. 
dollar interest rate options. 
6.C o n c l u s i o n
Our review of the literature shows that, theoretically, higher 
concentration may either increase or decrease the probability 
of a firm leaving the market as a result of distress. However, 
anecdotal evidence, and common sense, indicates that the 
market disruption generated by such an event would be more 
severe in concentrated markets. Hence, even if concentration 
were to reduce firms’ incentives to take risk and thus the 
potential for distress, public oversight would still be justified.
We find that market concentration has not followed a 
universal upward trend: concentration has increased in some 
markets and fallen in others. Markets have become more 
interdependent, it seems, as the same small set of financial 
firms has become more dominant across multiple markets. 
We argue that the risk or severity of financial instability 
depends not just on concentration, but also on whether other 
firms can promptly substitute for an exiting firm. By examining 
the concentration-substitution dimension, we are able to 
identify potentially problematic areas where the exit of a large 
player might exacerbate financial instability. 
What does our analysis say about the role of policymakers? 
If the severity of disruptions is limited by the availability of 
ready substitutes, what can or should policymakers do to 
enhance substitution? The answer depends on those factors 
that limit substitution in the first place. If close relationships 
are the limiting factor, laissez-faire may be optimal. Financial 
relationships are delicate, dynamic, and sometimes implicit 
contracts that are probably hard to improve from the top 
down. However, if the drag on substitution is customized 
products, policymakers might help in efforts to standardize. 
Standardization is a public good or externality, so public 
officials are right to lead efforts in that direction.30 The recent 
initiative to remove the backlog of uncleared derivatives trans-
actions and to hasten future clearing appears to be a good step. 
Policymakers may also have a say when the friction that limits 
substitution is some technological barrier; if privileged access 
to a key trading or pricing platform entrenches dominant 
providers and limits the choices of users, policymakers clearly 
have a legitimate interest to ensure both stability and 
competition. 
30All producers might gain from standardization, but no individual producer 
may have an incentive to lead and coordinate standardization initiatives. 
By focusing solely on market 
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We describe our investigation of the link between price 
stability and market concentration. The analysis focuses on 
investment-grade bonds and syndicated loans because pricing 
information is more transparent in these two markets. 
Information on corporate bond issuance was obtained from 
the Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation database. 
The final sample of bond issues excludes convertible issues 
and offerings by financial companies. The Loan Pricing 
Corporation DealScan database provides extensive 
information on syndicated loans granted to large and midsize 
corporations. 
The price of an investment-grade bond at issue is defined by 
its credit spread (yield to maturity minus a comparable-
maturity Treasury yield). Similarly, for syndicated loans the 
price is measured by the credit spread over LIBOR. The 
relationship between price stability and concentration is 
derived from a two-step estimation procedure. Let   
represent the bond (or loan) spread for firm   at time  . 
In the first stage, the credit spread is regressed on a set of 
explanatory variables defined by the vector  . In particular, 
(A1)                        .
The initial price of corporate bonds or syndicated loans is 
primarily determined by borrower and deal characteristics 
represented by   and macroeconomic conditions measured 
by the time-varying parameter  . In the case of bonds,   
includes the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) rating and firm size 
to capture the creditworthiness of the issuer. The bond price 
regression also controls for issue characteristics that are nor-
mally expected to affect the price of the security. In particular, 
we control for bond maturity, coupon rate, callability, sinking 
fund provisions, subordinate debt, and 144a issues. 
In the case of loans,   includes both a set of firm-specific 
variables and loan-specific variables. Included in the former 
set are proxies for the overall risk of the firm, such as its age 
and sales; proxies for the risk of the firm’s debt, such as the 
firm’s profit margin, its interest coverage, leverage, and 
earnings volatility; and proxies for the losses the firm’s debt 
holders can incur in the event of default, such as the firm’s 
tangible assets and the firm’s net working capital (current 
assets less current liabilities) divided by total debt. The 
regression controls for the firm’s growth opportunities and its 
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sector of activity. We also control for loan-specific variables, 
including controls for the purpose of the loan and for the type 
of loan contract; controls to distinguish, among other things, 
loans that are senior, those that are secured, and those that 
have a guarantor; and information on the maturity of the loan, 
its size, and variables to control for the size of the loan 
syndicate. 
The first-stage regression residual measure   represents 
the portion of the credit spread not explained by fundamentals. 
This component includes all the idiosyncratic shocks that may 
affect the issue markets. In the second stage of the estimation, 
we use the squared residuals   to construct a measure of price 
instability. This quality-adjusted volatility measure is next 
regressed on the annual Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
of market concentration, 
(A2)             .
Essentially, equation A2 asserts an additive form of hetero-
skedasticity on the error structure of the price equation A1. 
To obtain asymptotically efficient estimators, we use an 
iterative procedure described in Kmenta (1986). 
The results of the first-stage estimation are not reported in 
this article. As expected, in the case of bonds the S&P rating is 
the most significant variable impacting bond spreads. A one-
notch increase in the S&P rating (for example, from BBB to 
BBB+) lowers the spread on investment-grade bonds by 
roughly 12 basis points. Callability and bond maturity are also 
important factors increasing the costs to bond issuers. 
The coefficients for the control variables in our model on 
loan spreads are generally consistent with what we would 
expect. Older and larger firms, as well as firms with more 
tangible assets, pay significantly lower spreads. The market-to-
book ratio comes in strongly negative. Our proxies for default 
risk have their expected signs, and all but profit margin is 
strongly significant. The statistical insignificance of profit 
margin is likely due to the inclusion of interest coverage in our 
model. Our loan-specific controls are also generally consistent 
with our expectations. In contrast to the purpose of the loan, 
which appears to play only a limited role in the loan interest 
rate, the type of loan contract is important in this regard. 
Credit lines, for example, carry lower interest rates than do 
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larger loans and loans extended by larger syndicates have lower 
spreads. Loan features that increase loan safety (dividend 
restrictions, secured interests, guarantors, and sponsors) 
generally have positive effects on spreads. This finding is 
consistent with the well-established result that banks tend to 
require these features for riskier credits. Finally, longer term 
loans have lower spreads, but the effect is not statistically 
significant. 
Regarding the second stage of our method, we find that the 
estimates for the parameter vector   of the additive 
specification are significant for both investment-grade bonds 
and syndicated loans. Chart 1 illustrates more clearly the 
nonlinear volatility-concentration relationships for 
investment-grade bonds and syndicated loans estimated 
from the second-stage equation A2. 
γ 0 γ 1 γ 2 ,, ()
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